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Abstract
Using recently developed statistical methods for testing and dating
exhuberant behavior in asset prices we document evidence of episodic
bubbles in the New Zealand property market over the past two decades.
The results show clear evidence of a broad-based New Zealand housing
bubble that began in 2003 and collapsed over mid 2007 to early 2008 with
the onset of the worldwide recession and the financial crisis. New methods
of analyzing market contagion are also developed and are used to examine
spillovers from the Auckland property market to the other metropolitan
centres. Evidence from the latest data reveals that the greater Auckland
metropolitan area is currently experiencing a new property bubble that
began in 2013. But there is no evidence yet of any contagion eﬀect of this
bubble on the other centres, in contrast to the earlier bubble over 2003-
2008 for which there is evidence of transmission of the housing bubble
from Auckland to the other centres. One of our primary conclusions is
that the expensive nature of New Zealand real estate relative to potential
earnings in rents is partly due to the sustained market exuberance that
produced the broad based bubble in house prices during the last decade
and that has continued through the most recent bubble experienced in
the Auckland region since 2013.
Keywords : Bubble, Exuberance, Collapse, Contagion, Dating methods,
House prices, Property market, Sup test.
JEL classification codes : J61, R23, R30, C33
1 Introduction
Housing has become prohibitively expensive in many regions of New Zealand,
putting home ownership beyond the reach of a growing number of New Zealand
∗University of Auckland
†Yale University, University of Auckland, University of Southampton, and Singapore Man-
agement University.
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households, particularly those without wider sources of family financial sup-
port. House prices in a number of the main centres, including Auckland and
Christchurch, now sit at historic highs. For example, in February 2015 the me-
dian house price across the broader Auckland metropolitan area was $675,000
and the median household income was $85,865, giving a price-to-income ratio of
7.861 . Relative to economic fundamentals such as household income or rent, cur-
rent house prices in New Zealand are only surpassed in the latest Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) statistics2 by Australia,
Canada and Belgium. The ratio of the median property price to median income
across New Zealand was 5.2 in 2014, exceeding the corresponding ratio in the
U.S., Canada, the U.K., Ireland, Japan and Singapore3.
Policy-makers, as well as the public, should be concerned about these de-
velopments for many reasons. First, the rising cost of housing has major inter-
generational wealth eﬀects, reducing the relative wealth and welfare of younger
generations, renters, and first-time home buyers in relation to extant property
owners. To buy a house in Auckland at the median price of $675,000 with a 20%
deposit, a household with median income would need a deposit of $135,000 sup-
plemented by an 80% mortgage, making the deposit greater than 1.5 times the
household’s annual gross income. Without further financial resources, substan-
tial and persistent long term saving, or equity in existing property, these costs of
entry are prohibitive to most younger households. Escalating house prices also
exacerbate inequality by increasing the wealth gap between home owners and
renters, raising social tensions. Recent feature articles in New Zealand popular
magazines, such as North and South4, have drawn attention to these tensions by
focussing on the many perceived excesses of the New Zealand property market
relative to overseas markets, drawing harsh hedonic comparisons in terms of the
poor ‘value for money’ of run-down slum-level New Zealand housing in select
areas in Auckland relative to the up-market gentrified housing that is available
at comparable prices overseas in both Australia and the USA.
A second reason for concern is that large mortgages and high rates of leverage
put financial and macroeconomic stability at risk to housing market downturns,
as the financial crisis and Great Recession have illustrated in dramatic recent
ways in the US (Mian and Sufi, 2014). Financial stability is a particular concern
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), which has recently announced a
new regulatory separation of property investors from owner occupiers to assist in
lowering mortgage default risk implications for the wider economy in the event
of a New Zealand property market collapse.
A third concern for households and policy makers involves the labour market.
High housing costs in metropolitan areas can be an impediment to growth.
These costs typically inhibit labor mobility and prevent labor from moving from
1http://www.interest.co.nz/property/house-price-income-multiples
2The Economist, August 29 2014.
3Demographia, 2015
4North and South (April, 2015): “House Price Insanity: Why Auckland’s Mad Property
Market aﬀects All New Zealanders", 34-43; “Running on empty”, 44-49; “Generation Rent”,
50-53.
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depressed outlying regions to booming city centres to fill job openings (Saks,
2008; Zabel, 2012).
Against this background we ask the following questions. Is the present high
cost of housing in New Zealand sustainable? Is there an ongoing property bubble
in New Zealand and, if so, what regions are being or have been aﬀected? We
seek to explore some of these questions by examining empirical evidence on
house prices in New Zealand relative to rent and income fundamentals. Using
recently developed econometric methodology designed to test for the existence
of asset bubbles and to date-stamp bubble episodes, we assess the status of
housing markets in various regions of New Zealand. Our findings suggest that
the Auckland metropolitan area is currently experiencing a property bubble in
terms of the house price-to-rent ratio that began in 2013. We also document
evidence of an earlier and much broader-based bubble in New Zealand property
markets that emerged in the mid 2000s and subsequently collapsed upon the
onset of the Great Recession. The evidence indicates that this bubble likely
originated in the Auckland region before spreading to the other main centres. If
that recent history were to repeat itself, the ongoing property market bubble in
Auckland would be expected to aﬀect property prices in other regions. But, as
yet, there is no empirical evidence of this contagion to the other centres from the
current Auckland real estate bubble. So far, therefore, the ongoing Auckland
housing bubble is a phenomenon distinct from the other centres.
Our empirical methods draw on the bubble detection and dating methods de-
veloped originally in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) and more recently in Phillips,
Shi and Yu (2015a, 2015b; PSY). These methods associate the emergence of
asset price bubbles with mildly explosive growth in a time series of suitably
normalized asset prices. Because explosive behavior in the normalized price
violates the typical transversality condition required for closed form stable solu-
tions for asset prices, the statistical tests have a direct economic interpretation
in terms of a rational bubble or herd behavior market exuberance.
Our base dataset consists of nominal house prices for the 72 territorial au-
thorities (TAs) of New Zealand and spans 1993:Q1 to 2014:Q4. We find evidence
for real estate bubbles in 46 of the 72 TAs. But since this paper focuses on the
main metropolitan centres we use only 14 of these regions in the analysis that we
report in the present study. To calibrate the price data against housing market
fundamentals, we normalize house prices by rents in each region. So the empir-
ical tests relate to distinguishing normal martingale from explosive behavior in
the price-to-rent ratios. Rents are often used as an economic fundamental for
housing prices, in a similar manner to the way dividends provide fundamentals
for stock prices in much empirical work on the stock market. Regional incomes
are also used as a secondary fundamental.
Our empirical findings show that a broad-based housing bubble emerged
in the main centres of New Zealand (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and
Hamilton) in 2003 and that the bubble collapsed in 2007. Bubble contagion
regressions demonstrate how the emergence of a housing bubble in Auckland
City was followed by successive bubbles in Christchurch, Hamilton, and the
other territorial authorities that comprise the Auckland metro area. In addition,
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we find evidence of a second bubble that emerged in the Auckland metropolitan
area property market in late 2013. At the time of writing, this bubble is ongoing
and has not migrated to the other main centres. Our findings on the dates
and geographic incidence of these real estate bubbles are largely invariant to
changing the normalization of property prices by economic fundamentals from
rents to income. The additional results are reported in the Appendix.
We conclude the paper with a short discussion of possible scenarios through
which the Auckland property bubble could burst or more slowly deflate. The
price-to-rent ratio can fall by house prices falling, by an increase in rents, or by
some combination of these two channels. Household incomes ultimately place
an upper bound on the amount of income that can be spent on housing costs
(assuming that household incomes are exogenous to housing prices and rents).
We show that rental expenditures as a proportion of income have remained
remarkably constant over the past decade in the main centres of Auckland,
Wellington and Canterbury. For example, in the Auckland region rents have
remained consistently around 25% of expenditure since 2003. Thus, if a market
correction were to come through an increase in rents, this would involve an
unprecedented increase in rental expenditure shares. In our view, therefore,
any correction is more likely to come through an adjustment in prices driven by
a demand or supply side shock or combination of the two.
This paper joins a broader literature that has centered on identifying asset
price bubbles using formal statistical methods. Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011) used
similar methods to date the origination and termination of the NASDAQ stock
market bubble during the 1990s in the US. Phillips and Yu (2011) identified a
sequence of successive bubbles in various financial assets and commodities over
the past two decades that included the GFC and its aftermath eﬀects on the
real economy. Their focus was on the concatenating eﬀects of bubbles across
diﬀerent markets. In other recent work PSY (2015b) examined long historical
data in stock prices over some 150 years, dating the onset and collapse of multiple
bubbles in the S&P 500 over this time period. The present paper contributes
also to a recent literature that has focussed on the housing market and the
determination of house prices in New Zealand, including Grimes, Holmes and
Tarrant (2010), Grimes and Hyland (2013) and Grimes and Mitchell (2015).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section
begins by briefly outlining the econometric methodology to be employed in the
empirical work of testing and dating real estate bubbles in New Zealand. It
then applies these methods to the data and discusses the empirical findings
that relate to the existence and dating of bubbles as well as possible contagion
eﬀects over time. We conclude with a discussion of possible scenarios of collapse
in the New Zealand property market.
2 Empirics
We applied the econometric methods discussed above to data on regional real
estate prices, rents and incomes in various metropolitan centres of New Zealand.
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The application reveals how prices have evolved relative to rent (as well as in-
come) fundamentals over the last two decades, considers evidence relating to the
existence of house price bubbles, and explores contagion diaspora eﬀects from
the Auckland metropolitan region as the core centre to the other metropolitan
regions.
2.1 Modelling Asset Bubbles
The bubble tests proposed by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a) are based on estab-
lishing explosiveness in normalized asset prices using a reduced form technique.
This method identifies an asset bubble through the estimation of autoregressive
eﬀects and right sided unit root tests to assess the significance of any depar-
tures that exceed unity in the autoregressive response. The empirical models
used here are based on a simple first order autoregression or AR(1) of the form
Δyt = α+ βyt−1 + et, t = 1, . . . , T, (1)
where yt denotes the log normalized house price at time t. (In what follows
regional house prices are normalized by dividing by regional rents before taking
logarithms: see the discussion below for more details.) Asset bubbles in the
expansionary phase are associated with the centered AR(1) coeﬃcient in (1)
satisfying β > 0: This corresponds to explosive autoregressive behavior in a
time series with autoregressive coeﬃcient 1+ β > 1. Statistical tests of exuber-
ance in asset prices therefore reduce to establishing whether the centered AR(1)
coeﬃcient β is positive and statistically significant over a subsample of the time
period considered. The null hypothesis for this test is therefore β ≤ 0. The
bubble tests are consistent against such mildly explosive alternatives, and given
the major diﬀerences in the shape of the null and alternative distributions, these
tests typically have much strong discriminatory power in the explosive direction
than unit root tests do against stationary alternatives.
In order to permit episodic bubbles we follow Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a
& 2015b; PSY) and permit structural breaks in the autoregressive coeﬃcient β
that accommodate shifts between normal (β = 0) and bubble periods (β > 0)
in the process. This is achieved by recursively estimating (1) over subsamples
of varying size. Tests of the null are then based on conventional unit root
(Dickey-Fuller) test statistics for each subsample. The procedure yields a global
supremum augmented Dicker-Fuller (GSADF) statistic, which is used to detect
the presence of a bubble within the entire sample, and a time series of backwards
supremum augmented Dickey-Fuller (BSADF) statistics, which are used to date
the onset and the collapse of any bubbles. Details of the construction of these
statistics and the precise dating methods are given in the Technical Appendix.
Explosiveness in the asset price is consistent with the concept of a ratio-
nal bubble, which will manifest itself as accelerating growth in the asset price
over time. Following the discussion in Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997), we









where Dt denotes the income stream from the asset between time t − 1 and t,
R denotes the constant discount rate on the asset, and Bt is a rational bubble





, thereby manifesting itself as accelerat-
ing growth in the asset price over time. (See the discussion in Phillips, Wu and
Yu, 2011, for the case where the discount rate is permitted to vary over time,
and Phillips and Lee, 2015, for the validity of a log linear approximation). Al-
though (2) embodies predictions about how a bubble manifests in asset prices,
it says nothing about what events originate or fuel such a bubble. Tirole (1985)
considered conditions under which rational bubbles can survive in general equi-
librium.
The bubble detection tests are inherently reduced-form, since they are based
on the observed behaviour of the asset price over a prolonged time period. A
primary benefit of the reduced-form approach is that it captures the main (sub-
martingale) characteristics of rational and irrational bubbles, therefore embody-
ing many diﬀerent structural model alternatives that can lead to an explosive
asset price. This strength should not be underestimated, given that there is
presently no unifying theoretical framework or consensus in financial economics
that enables a workable structural model of asset bubbles. The main draw-
back of the reduced-form approach is that observed explosiveness in the asset
price could be rationalized in terms of explosiveness in either the realized or
the expected income stream from the asset. The former problem is easily dealt
with by standardizing the asset price by the dividend: in empirical applications
bubble detection tests are often applied to log price-to-dividend ratios, and in
our empirical application we use price-to-rent ratios. This leaves explosiveness
in expected future dividends as a possible driver of explosiveness in normalized
asset prices. In this regard, narratives that can generate explosive growth in
expected dividends over a sustained period of time often lack credibility: these
require not only that the expected present value of future dividends grows in
each time period, but that the growth is exponential. In other words, not only
do we require good news about future dividend growth in each successive time
period, but we need successive items of news to be incrementally better than
past news. In the context of real estate markets, it is important to note that
commonly given explanations for high house prices - such as low interest rates
or high migration rates - do not in themselves provide an explanation for a
sustained acceleration in price growth.
We also normalize house prices by household incomes (although the available
data is more limited). By doing so we address concerns regarding explosiveness
in expected future rents as the driving force behind accelerating price growth,
since household incomes place an ultimate upper bound on rents. This argument
requires household incomes to be exogenous to house prices. Over the short
term, measured regional incomes may increase with house prices by self selection
demographic eﬀects as low income households are forced out of the region. Such
selection eﬀects of price appreciation are however limited: Auckland cannot be
expected to turn into Silicon Valley simply because of spiraling house prices.
The asset bubble tests are conservative in a well defined sense. Whereas a
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high asset price level (relative to some fundamental) often draws concern from
economists and media commentators (e.g., The Economist, 2005), a high asset
price level will not in itself lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that β > 0 in
(1). In fact, due to the presence of the intercept in (1), asset prices may well drift
upwards over time under the null β = 0. As shown below, price-to-rent ratios
across the main centres of New Zealand have experienced sustained increases
over the past two decades - particularly in Auckland - but this feature of the
data is not in itself interpreted as evidence of a bubble under our approach. It is
only when asset prices exhibit accelerating growth over a sustained period (i.e.
when the data supports the alternative hypothesis that β > 0 up to some level
of statistical precision) that a bubble is detected.
2.2 Data
Our complete dataset consists of quarterly nominal house prices (Pi,t) and nom-
inal rents (Ri,t) at time t for each territorial authority (city or region) i. The
data span Q1 1993 to Q4 2014 and cover 72 territorial authorities. In the present
application, we focus attention exclusively on the most populous metropolitan
centres. Rents are adjusted for seasonality and outliers. Additional details
about the data and filters used to finalize the data are given in the Appendix.
The series we use for real estate bubble testing are the log price-to-rent ratios
for each region, viz.,
yi,t = log (Pi,t)− log (Ri,t) (3)
These ratios anchor real estate asset prices to asset income as a fundamental,
using a normalization that also helps to remove broader inflationary eﬀects from
the price series. Under the econometric methodology described above, periods in
which explosive growth in asset prices is found without commensurate explosive
growth in asset incomes are associated with real estate asset bubbles.
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Figure 1: Price to Rent Ratios in the Main Centres
Figure 1 exhibits quarterly price-to-rent ratios over 1993 to 2014 for the cen-
tral territorial authority in the four most populous metropolitan areas: Auck-
land. Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton. All four ratios exhibit a large
increase over the 2003 to 2008 period, after which there is a small decline. Price
ratios in Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton remain relatively constant over
the subsequent period 2008 to 2014. Prices fluctuate between 20 and 25 times
annual rents over this period. In contrast, the price-to-rent ratio for Auckland
City begins to increase again in late 2013. Currently the ratio sits at about 35,
which corresponds to a rental return of about 2.8% before depreciation.
Figure 2 shows price-to-rent ratios for the four main territorial authorities
within the broader Auckland metropolitan area: Auckland City (corresponding
to central Auckland), North Shore, Manukau and Waitakere. All four series
exhibit very similar movements over time. Interestingly, the price-to-rent ratios
in Auckland and North Shore are larger by a clear margin than those of Manukau
and Waitakere. All four series move together over time in a very similar pattern
that includes two significant growth periods in the asset-price ratios, so that the
2014Q4 observation is an all time high for each series.
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Figure 2: Price to Rent Ratios of Territorial Authorities in the Auckland
Metro Area.
2.3 Testing for Exuberance
Figures 1 and 2 show that there has been a general upward, but by no means
monotonic, movement in the price-to-rent ratios of housing for the four most
populous cities of New Zealand over the sample period. Within the time frame
1993 to 2014 there are periods of substantial growth in each of the series, with
some evident similarities and diﬀerences over certain subperiods. Our primary
interest is to assess empirical evidence for periods of exuberance in the real
estate markets for these regions and determine episodes of bubble activity. Ac-
cordingly, we implemented the formal tests for explosive market behavior in the
normalized prices for each of the city centres and territorial authorities.
The table below exhibits calculated values of the GSADF statistic for the
fourteen most populous territorial authorities in New Zealand.
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Lower Hutt City 2.9861*
Napier City 7.6811*
Palmerston North City 3.2206*
Porirua City 2.1751*
Tauranga 5.9339*
Upper Hutt City 3.2139*
Wellington City 2.0230*
* and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively
The results from this test are unequivocal: evidently exuberance in house
prices is broad-based throughout New Zealand, occurring in all regions consid-
ered at the 1% level with the sole exception of Dunedin city, which is significant
at the 5% level.
In 26 of the 72 TAs there is little evidence of real estate bubbles. These
regions are mainly rural (or with large rural areas). In particular, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level for the following TAs: Ashburton,
Franklin, Papakura, Buller, Carterton, Central Otago, Greymouth, Hurunui,
Kaikoura, Kaipara, Kawerau, MacKenzie, Opotiki, Otorohanga, Queenstown
Lakes, Rangitikei, Selwyn, South Wairarapa, Southland, Waikato, Waimate,
Wairoa, Waitomo, Western Bay of Plenty, Westland, and Whakatane.
2.4 Episodic Bubbles
Figure 3 shows recursive calculations of the BSADF statistics for territorial au-
thorities representing the four most populous regions (Auckland, Wellington,
Christchurch and Hamilton). The figure also graphs recursively the correspond-
ing critical value for this recursion which is used for the crossing time dating
algorithm. The critical value increases monotonically in the sample size, re-
flecting the dependence of the asymptotic distribution of the statistic on the
date fraction and test size control that enables consistent date stamping and
reduces the false positive detection probability under the null to zero asymp-
totically (Phillips and Yu, 2011, and see the Technical Appendix for details).
We use Auckland city and Wellington city to represent the broader Auckland
and Wellington metro areas, respectively. We date the origination of the asset
bubble by noting the first crossing time of the critical value curve when the
recursive test statistic sequence crosses the 5% significance threshold.
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Figure 3: Backwards supremum ADF statistics for the main centres shown
against the 5% critical value of the test. Vertical dashed lines (−−) indicate
the onset of bubbles in Auckland City; vertical dot-dashed lines (− ·−)
indicate the bursting of the bubble.
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Figure 4: Backwards supremum ADF statistics for the Auckland Metro Area
shown against the 5% critical value of the test. Vertical dashed lines (−−)
indicate the onset of bubbles in Auckland City; vertical dot-dashed lines
(− ·−) indicate the bursting of the bubble.
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There is evidence of a New Zealand-wide real estate bubble over the 2003-
2008 period. Both Auckland and Wellington statistics cross the 5% threshold
in Q2 2003. Christchurch follows in Q3 2003, and Hamilton follows in Q4 2004.
Note that although Wellington and Auckland first cross the 5% threshold at
the same time, the Auckland test statistic climbs much higher, indicating far
stronger significance in the bubble test statistic. Indeed, at a one percent level
of statistical significance for the recursive statistic we would only reject the
null hypothesis of no bubble for Auckland. The bubble collapses around the
time of the onset of the worldwide recession in late 2007 and early 2008. The
Christchurch test statistic permanently falls below the critical value in Q4 2007,
while the corresponding date for Hamilton is Q1 2008. Auckland and Wellington
exit from the bubble earlier, in Q2 2007 and Q4 2006, respectively. (On these
dates the statistic falls below the critical value permanently for Wellington, and
for a prolonged period in the case of Auckland.)
Figure A1 in the Appendix depicts house prices (and rents) for the four main
centres. It is evident that the collapse of the bubble was associated with a fall
in house prices (rather than only an increase in rents). The collapse in house
prices is on the order of magnitude of about 10% from peak to trough for each of
the main centres. House prices fell by 11% in Auckland City, 8% in Wellington
City, 10% in Christchurch and 12% in Hamilton. Our findings regarding bubble
collapse mirror those typically found in asset markets: termination of a bubble
is associated with a fall in the nominal price of the asset, rather than a rise in
the fundamental — see Phillips and Yu (2011) and PSY (2015b). The magnitude
of the price correction is however smaller, and more drawn out, than those found
in more liquid asset markets (such as equity markets).
In the more recent period following 2008 there appears to be an Auckland-
specific bubble, with the Auckland test statistic crossing the 5% threshold level
in Q3 of 2013. This bubble in the real estate market is confined to the Auckland
region, as the recursive statistics for all other centres show no evidence of an
approach to the critical value since 2008, although there is some notable volatil-
ity in the case of the statistic for Christchurch which perhaps reflects market
uncertainties in the aftermath of the earthquake and over the rebuilding of the
city.
Figure 4 graphs the recursive backwards supremum ADF statistics for ter-
ritorial authorities within the Auckland metro area. Note that Auckland city
leads the other three regions into the mid 2000s bubble by one quarter, with
Manukau, Waitakere and the North Shore crossing the threshold in Q3 2003.
At the end of the bubble, Manukau and North Shore then cross back over the
threshold in Q3 2007, with Waitakere crossing in Q4 2007. The collapse of the
mid-2000s bubble was associated with a fall in prices right across the Auckland
Metropolitan Area, as shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix. From peak to
trough, house prices fell by 10% in Waitakere and North Shore, and by 9% in
Manukau.
The more recent bubble that has emerged in late 2013 appears across the
four main territorial authorities in the Auckland metro area, showing that the
origination of the new bubble is quite broadly based in the Auckland region.
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(All four statistics cross the 5% threshold in Q3 2013.) However, this bubble
appears not to be uniformly sustained across the Auckland regions. The statistic
for North Shore, for instance, clearly drops below the critical value in Q4 2013
before crossing it again in Q1 2014. Waitakere drops below the critical value
permanently in Q4 2013. Only the statistic for Manukau remains above the
threshold for the entire six quarters from Q3 2013 to Q4 2014. Nonetheless, the
statistic for Auckland City, Manukau and North Shore are above the threshold
for the final two quarters of 2014, and the statistic for Waitakere appears to
be quickly approaching the threshold, all of which suggests that the ongoing
bubble in the Auckland region is pervasive.
2.5 Testing for Bubbles in Price to Income Ratios
Household incomes are also often used as an economic fundamental for real es-
tate prices. In this section we demonstrate that our main empirical findings
regarding the timing and geographic incidence of New Zealand real estate bub-
bles remain broadly the same when average incomes are used as the relevant
fundamental for house prices. In particular, we find that Auckland leads the rest
of the country both into and out of the mid-2000s real estate bubble, and that
Auckland is currently experiencing a new real estate bubble. The onset of these
bubbles are dated slightly earlier in the price-to-income data, as documented
below.
Figure 5: Price to Income Ratios
We use average annual earnings per full time equivalent worker as the mea-
sure of income. The available data are relatively limited, and so our analysis is
constrained to the Auckland and Wellington metropolitan areas from Q3 1999
onwards. Earnings are obtained for the Auckland and Wellington area Regional
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Councils. We use the Auckland and Wellington Area residential Quotable Value
New Zealand (QVNZ) price indices for the corresponding house prices. We also
include the whole of New Zealand in the analysis in order to provide a rudimen-
tary understanding of bubble contagion.
Figure 5 exhibits the price-to-income ratio for Auckland, Wellington and
New Zealand. Similar trend trajectories are evident in the price-to-income and
price-to-rent ratios for the Auckland and Wellington regions, although there is
some disparity in the trajectories towards the end of the period following 2012.
The table below exhibits calculated values of the global backwards supremum
ADF statistics.




* and denotes statistical significance at the 1% level
Figure 6 exhibits recursive calculations of the backwards supremum ADF
statistics together with the right-tailed 5% critical value. As before, we date
the origination of the asset bubble by noting the first crossing time of the critical
value curve when the recursive test statistic sequence crosses the 5% significance
threshold. We include vertical lines to indicate the origination (dashed lines −
−) and collapse (dot-dashed lines − · −) of bubbles in the Auckland market.
Interestingly the onset of the episodic real estate bubbles is dated to occur
slightly earlier when incomes are used as the fundamental rather than rents.
The Auckland test-statistic crosses the 5% critical value threshold in Q3 2002,
leading that of the rest of New Zealand and Wellington, which cross in Q4 2002
and Q3 2003, respectively. The bubble in Auckland collapses much earlier (Q1
2006) than in New Zealand (Q4 2007) or Wellington (Q1 2008), although the
test-statistic for Auckland remains high until mid 2007. The recent Auckland
bubble emerges in Q3 2012, leading New Zealand as a whole over the threshold
by one year (the NZ test-statistic crosses in Q2 2013). This is not inconsistent
with the second bubble being characterized as an Auckland-specific bubble since
approximately one third of the population resides in Auckland and Auckland
price statistics dominate the New Zealand data.
15
Figure 6: Backwards supremum ADF statistics shown against the 5% critical
value of the test. Vertical dashed lines (−−) indicate the onset of bubbles in
the Auckland region; vertical dot-dashed lines (− ·−) indicate the bursting of
the bubble.
2.6 Bubble Contagion
The evidence reported above suggests that the mid 2000s bubble originated in
certain regions of the country first before spreading to the outlying regions.
To model this diaspora of real estate market exuberance we estimate a series
of contagion regressions as follows. We proceed by estimating autoregressions
of the form (1) for each region recursively over the sample period, leading to
the slope coeﬃcient estimates βˆi,s, where i indexes the geographic region and
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s indexes the ending date of the subsample (s = S, ..., T ). With these data in
hand, we fit the following empirical functional regression





βˆcore,s−d + errors, s = S, ..., T, (4)
from some initialization date S for j = core, where core denotes a candidate
core region where the asset bubble is hypothesized to originate. The quantity d
that appears in the subscript of βˆcore,s−d is a non-negative delay parameter that
captures the lag in market contagion from the core center on other regions. In
our empirics, we allow for integer settings of d that range from a lag of zero to
12 months, so that d ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 12}. We therefore require initial data of at
least S − d ≥ 2 observations to be suﬃcient to calculate the estimate βˆcore,s−d.
In practice we select the lag order d by nonlinear least squares regression, which
amounts in the present case to choosing the regression (4) with the largest R2.
See (8) in the Technical Appendix for more details.
We considered two methods for selecting the subsample sequence of recur-
sively estimated centered autoregressive coeﬃcients βˆi,s. These methods involve
the use of either an expanding subsample or a fixed window width subsample.






recursively estimated (as the sample size increases) by least squares regression
on (1) with the expanding subsample {t = 1, . . . , s} for s = S, S+1, . . . , T . Ac-





are obtained by regression on a moving window of data of length S. In this case,
βˆi,s is the least squares slope coeﬃcient from a fitted least squares regression
of (1) using the data window {t = s− S + 1, . . . , s} for s = S, S + 1, . . . , T . By
virtue of its construction, the fixed window approach provides estimates βˆi,s
that depend on data over a window of time of fixed length S in the vicinity
of the latest observation s. These estimates therefore have a sharper focus on
the immediate data point than the expanding sample scheme estimates which
use data from the origination date to the latest observation. In what follows
we report results obtained with the fixed window subsample method. For im-
plementation with the New Zealand real estate data, we set the fixed window
sample size as S = 0.33× T  = 29.
We select Auckland City as the core for two reasons. First, the wider Auck-
land region (Auckland City, Manukau, North Shore and Waitakere) accounts
for a larger share of economic output than any other territorial authority or
metropolitan area in the country. Second, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 above,
the Auckland City real estate market exhibits exuberance before all other de-
picted regions except Wellington. As mentioned above, although Auckland and
Wellington cross the 5% threshold at the same time, only Auckland city crosses
the 1% threshold (this is not depicted in the figures), which is indicative of the
strength of the market exuberance experienced in Auckland. In addition, when
incomes are used as the relevant fundamental, the Auckland region crosses the
5% threshold before the Wellington region.
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The regression equation (4) is a functional regression in which the primary
coeﬃcient δ2j (r) is time-varying. This formulation permits the contagion eﬀect
from the core to a particular region to evolve smoothly over time. The vari-
able responses over time accommodate possibly stronger (weaker) responses to
the core bubble behaviour at various points during the pre-, post- and bubble
episodes. For example, the eﬀect of the core on a certain region j may take the
time form of a ∩ shape, in which the contagion eﬀect grows over some inter-
val of time (following the emergence of a bubble in the core) before reaching a
maximum and then declining. The time varying coeﬃcient function δ2j (r) may
be estimated by local level kernel regression. Details are given in the Technical
Appendix.
We explored an alternate approach in which the response function to the
core market, δ2 (r) , was held constant and did not vary with time. Fixed re-
sponses seem more compatible a priori with homogeneous markets rather than
markets for real estate where location specific eﬀects are prevalent. As demon-
strated above, regional heterogeneity in New Zealand house prices is suﬃciently
large to merit a flexible approach to modelling contagion eﬀects over time and
the diaspora of market exuberance stemming from a core market. A prominent
example of the need for flexibility in the present case is that the 2003-2008 real
estate bubble was broad-based and experienced across many diﬀerent regions
in New Zealand, whereas the ongoing real estate bubble is, as yet, location spe-
cific to the Auckland region. Use of a fixed coeﬃcient regression specification is
too restrictive to capture such evolving inter-regional dynamics. Empirical evi-
dence for the misspecification in the present case was manifest in the regression
residuals exhibiting unit root behaviour, making the fixed coeﬃcient response
regression equation a spurious regression.
Figure 7 exhibits estimates for the main centres (Wellington, Christchurch,
Hamilton) outside of Auckland, which is treated as the core centre. The sen-
sitivity of these three centres to the Auckland market is clearly evident in the
figure and shows some commonality of movement over the sample period fol-
lowing an inverted U shape. The sensitivity apparently rises to a peak in all
cases during the 2003 to 2008 housing bubble and the subsequent collapse but
then declines. In particular, over the course of the recent Auckland-specific real
estate bubble beginning in 2013, the response function of these centres to the
Auckland market declines. In fact, the response becomes negative in all these
cases over the last year 2014, indicative of an adverse reaction in the regional
centres relative to Auckland’s exuberance. This eﬀect is particularly notice-
able for Wellington, whose response function to the Auckland market becomes
strongly negative towards the end of 2014.
The estimated delay parameter d varies across the main centres. For Welling-
ton, the estimated parameter is zero, indicating that the is no delay in contagion
from Auckland to Wellington. As shown in Figure 3, the mid 2000s bubble be-
gan in Auckland and Wellington in the same quarter. The delay parameter for
Christchurch is 2, corresponding to a two quarter lag. As we saw in Figure 3
above, the mid-2000s bubble emerges in Christchurch one quarter after Auck-
land. The delay parameter for Hamilton is much larger, corresponding to 5
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quarters. Hamilton enters the mid-2000s bubble six quarters after Auckland.
Figure 8 exhibits similarly calculated response function estimates for terri-
torial authorities within the Auckland metropolitan area to the Auckland city
market. Interestingly, the sensitivity of all of these Auckland regions to central
Auckland has also shown evidence of decline, most particularly following the
collapse of the mid 2000s real estate bubble in 2008, but is still clearly posi-
tive. Interestingly too, there is evidence of a recent increase in responsiveness
to the Auckland market during the recent Auckland-specific bubble. This is
particularly evident for the North Shore region of Auckland. These findings
indicate more cohesiveness in the Auckland real estate market during periods
of exuberance and collapse than across New Zealand as a whole.
Figure 7: Time-varying Contagion Coeﬃcients from the Auckland City Real
Estate Market for the Main Centres.
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Figure 8: Time-varying Contagion Coeﬃcients from the Auckland City Real
Estate Market for Other Territorial Authorities in the Auckland Metropolitan
Area.
The results exhibited in Figures 7 and 8 are largely descriptive in nature,
showing how the time varying responses in the regional coeﬃcients relate to
those of Auckland through the kernel regression specification (4). The more
fundamental question of identifying the driver variables that may underlie bub-
ble contagion requires a more sophisticated modeling apparatus. We briefly
describe here how such a model might be constructed to capture the mechanism
of contagion as this may be useful in future work.
Suppose Xs is a collection of driver variables that have the potential to
initiate a bubble and precipitate a collapse. Assuming A is the originating region
for the bubble, we might functionalize this region’s autoregressive coeﬃcients in
a varying coeﬃcient form as βA = βA (Xt−1) so that the real estate price/rent
ratio yA,t in A has generating mechanism
ΔyA,t = αA (Xt−1) + βA (Xt−1) yA,t−1 + eA,t, t = 1, . . . , T, (5)
in which the intercept and slope coeﬃcients depend on the driver variables.
Such a model has the form of a nonlinear predictive regression. Further, if the
slope coeﬃcient βA has the localized (mildly explosive) form βA = cAkT where
1
kT
+ kTT → 0, the coeﬃcient cA may be functionalized on driver variables at
each time period so that cA = cA (Xt−1) . Then cA (Xt−1) > 0 would produce
mildly explosive behaviour consonant with the expansionary phase of a bubble
and cA (Xt−1) < 0 would produce mildly integrated behaviour consonant with
reversion to normal market behavior in which βA = 0. Phillips and Yu (2011)
suggested some related ideas to explain bubble spillover eﬀects and implemented
the ideas to help explain market abnormality spillovers associated with the
general financial crisis.
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To make a model such as (5) operational, observable driver variables Xs
need to be listed and functional forms for the intercept and slope parameter
dependencies {αA (Xt−1) ,βA (Xt−1)} need to be specified, unless nonparamet-
ric methods are employed. The roots of a property market bubble, like those
of any market abnormality, typically reside in supply and demand distortions,
some elements of which may be embodied in observable variables as components
of Xs. In the New Zealand market, for instance, supply constraints include the
country’s physical geography, local zoning regulations, a variety of resource con-
sent or building consent obstacles, as well as shortages of skilled trade labour
and construction workers. Demographic changes from a growing population,
returning ex patriates, and immigration provide additional demand pressures
by injecting new-money into the housing market especially for desirable real
estate in Auckland city, waterfront, rural, and island locations. These pressures
overspill with relocations, retirements, vacation home, and multiple rental home
purchases in a diaspora of new demand in regional markets.
This short and incomplete summary indicates some of the multifarious influ-
ences at work in driving real estate markets beyond the immediate return from
rental income and the eﬀect of policy measures that include interest rates and
lending practices in the financial industry. Just as the combined eﬀects of these
many variables may lead to market exuberance, unexpected shocks to them may
equally well lead to market correction.
3 Will the Auckland Real Estate Bubble Burst?
Our empirical findings show that a new housing bubble emerged in the Auckland
region during 2013. The Auckland bubble has, as yet, not been accompanied
by a broader real estate bubble in other New Zealand centres, unlike the bub-
ble that began in 2003. Natural questions to ask now are whether this bubble
will continue and is there a market correction on the horizon? Answering such
questions using econometric methods is beyond the scope of the present appa-
ratus. To do so requires a generative mechanism for the bubble with driver
variables that can serve as predictors. Instead, in this section we explore the
extent to which rents and incomes would have to rise in order to bring Auck-
land price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios back into line with the rest of the
country.
Our empirical analysis uses data on house prices normalized by either rents
or incomes. The finding of exuberance in a real estate market such as Auckland
does not necessarily imply a house price correction is on the horizon. The
findings show only that relative to either rent or income fundamentals, growth
in housing prices has been irrational. A return to market normality in the price-
to-rent or price-to-income ratio does not necessarily imply a future correction
in house prices, because there is also the possibility that rents and incomes in
Auckland will catch up to prices, thereby bringing the ratios back to normalcy.
How feasible is a market correction based on only a rent increase in Auck-
land? Currently the price-to-rent ratio in Auckland City and the North Shore is
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around 35 (see figure 1), while the price-to-rent ratios in Wellington, Christchurch
and Hamilton are between 22 and 24 (see figure 1). If prices in all regions were
held constant, rents in Auckland City and North Shore would have to increase
by more than a third ( 35−2335 	 0.34) in order to bring the Auckland City and
North Shore price-rent ratios in line with the levels of the other centres. The
corresponding rental increase needed to bring the price-to-rent ratio in Manukau
and Waitakere in line with the other main centres is about 12% ( 26−2326 	 0.12),
given that the price-to-rent ratios in these regions is currently around 26.
Any real estate market correction based on an increase in rents entails a
commensurate increase in the share of household incomes devoted to rent (if
incomes are held constant). We therefore consider the current proportion of
household income devoted to housing costs, and whether there has been any
such steep rise in rents in the past. Mean annual household income in the
broader Auckland region (including Auckland City, Manukau, Waitakere, North
Shore, Franklin, Rodney, and Papakura) in 2014 was $95,784 ( = $1,842 × 52).
(Source: Statistics New Zealand).5 The population-weighted annualized rents in
the Auckland region were approximately $25,115 in Q4 2014, which corresponds
to just over a quarter of the household budget.6 The mean annualized rent in
Q4 2000 was $14,008, and the mean household income was $57,304 (= $1,102
× 52), so that mean rent was about 25% of income. The mean annualized rent
in Q4 2010 was $21,252, and the mean household income was $81,588, so that
mean rent was again about 25% of mean income. These results show broad
stability in the ratio of rents to incomes over a 15 year period.
Of course there is vast heterogeneity underlying these aggregate sample sta-
tistics, but the average household rental expenditure has stayed relatively con-
stant in the broader Auckland region at around 25% of income. Rents are
therefore by no means low relative to incomes. But it is certainly feasible that
rents could increase substantially, thereby bringing house prices more in line
with rent fundamentals. But such an increase in the budget share of rents
would clearly be unprecedented, at least in the data currently available to us
over the last two decades. We therefore conclude that to return the Auckland
market to normalcy in terms of its price-to-rent ratio a more likely outcome is
a housing price correction.
The percentage increase in incomes necessary to bring the price-to-income
ratio of Auckland into line with that of Wellington is even more substantial.
The Auckland region price-to-income ratio is almost twice that of Wellington
(see figure 5), meaning that Auckland incomes would have to almost double to
achieve alignment. A housing price correction is therefore far more likely than
an increase in incomes if the price-to-income ratio in Auckland is to return to
5Retrieved from: http://nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz/wbos/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLECODE7464#
March 20 2015.
6The figure is inexact because we lack rents for the entire Auckland region. Instead,
we obtain an approximate average rent by weighting TA rents with population weights, as
calculated by the authors based on Statistics NZ subnational population data for 2014. The
weights were as follows: Auckland City: 0.3; Franklin: 0.05; North Shore: 0.2; Manukau:
0.24; Papakura: 0.05; Rodney: 0.05; Waitakere: 0.14.
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normalcy.
Such price corrections have occurred in many other countries that have ex-
perienced house price inflation in recent years. Yet the New Zealand real estate
market has largely been spared such major corrections over the last two decades.
International factors may now be playing a role in the New Zealand market, pro-
viding some degree of insulation from downturns as ‘new money’ drivers from
foreigners, immigrants and ex patriates assist in sustaining demand side market
pressure on prices and, in the process, bringing the prices of desirable real es-
tate, particularly in Auckland, coastal and island locations, in line with prices
of similar real estate overseas.
4 Extensions and Conclusion
The data available on the New Zealand real estate market are extensive and
considerably larger in the spatial dimension than the data we have used in the
analysis reported here. More specifically, the base dataset for the time period
Q1 1993 to Q4 2014 that we have used here actually covers 72 diﬀerent territorial
authorities. There is, therefore, substantial scope for further empirical work to
investigate linkages between rural and metropolitan regions and the eﬀects of
location-specific hedonics on housing market diﬀerentials. Response regressions
of the type used in (1) may be extended to accommodate regional eﬀects and
to include potential driver variables to explain regional market diﬀerentials.
There is also scope for new econometric research on spatio-temporal panel
econometric methods suited to the investigation of bubbles. In particular, the
methodology of bubble testing and date-stamping algorithms may be extended
to spatial panels to take advantage of the eﬀects of cross section averaging.
The limit theory for such models has yet to be studied. Associated extensions
involve tests for homogeneity in the autoregressive slope coeﬃcients across re-
gional members of the panel and potential bubble classification methodology to
determine commonality in behavior within certain groups of territorial author-
ities.
Notwithstanding all these potential extensions, the present study shows that
much can be achieved with current methods. Our findings reveal the following
distinctive features of the New Zealand real estate market over the last two
decades. First, the expensive nature of New Zealand real estate relative to
potential earnings in rents is partly explained by sustained market exuberance
that produced a broad-based bubble in housing price-to-rent ratios during the
mid 2000s that included all the major metropolitan centres. Second, empirical
evidence confirms that the Auckland city real estate market led the emergence
of bubbles in the other centres by up to two quarters in 2003, as well as other
territorial authorities within the Auckland region by a single quarter. Third,
estimation of the response function of the regional real estate markets to the
core Auckland city region reveals a commonality of regional response over the
sample period that follows an inverted U shape over time, rising to a peak during
the 2003 to 2008 housing bubble and then subsequently declining. Finally, the
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data reveal that a new bubble in the Auckland real estate market emerged in
2013 and is ongoing but has yet to influence other regional centres.
5 Appendix
5.1 Technical Appendix
5.1.1 Asymptotic Theory for Bubble Detection Methods
The econometric theory of testing for exuberance allows for a triangular array
formulation of (1) in which the intercept α = αT and slope coeﬃcient β = βT
may both depend on the sample size. Such a specification accommodates mildly
explosive (rather than fixed explosive) processes for which βT = bkT is local to
zero with fixed b and for some positive numerical sequence kT → ∞ satisfying
kT
T → 0 as T → ∞. This formulation implies that βT gives rise to an AR(1)
coeﬃcient γT = 1+ bkT in (1) that Phillips and Magdalinos (2007) characterize
as mildly explosive, because the coeﬃcient γT is further from unity as T →∞




interval around unity associated with local to unity roots
(Phillips, 1987; Chan and Wei, 1987). Such mildly explosive autoregressive roots
γT = 1+ bkT penetrate more deeply into the explosive zone of the autoregressive
parameter than local unit roots of the form γT = 1 + bT .
The intercept αT may also be sample size dependent, which allows for a
localized drift in the time series under the null hypothesis. This specification
oﬀers some empirical advantage when dealing with time series whose normal
behavior is well modeled in terms of a stochastic trend with a small deterministic
linear drift. Such specifications often work well with time series of asset prices
in normal market periods where no exuberance is present. The reader is referred
to Phillips, Shi and Yu (2014) for further discussion of such localized parameter
specifications and for the limit theory that applies in such cases.
Testing for Bubbles The test is based on global backwards supremum ADF
statistics of the form

























Δyt,r1,r2 = Δyt −
r2T		
t=r1T	




The notations in these formulae correspond to those in PSY (2015).
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In particular, the subscripted fractions (r1, r2) indicate the subsample win-
dow of data over which the statistics are computed and r0 is the sample fraction
corresponding to the minimum window width and, hence, the initialization of
the recursive sequence of statistics. Thus, βˆr1,r2 denotes the OLS estimator of β
in equation (1) based on the subsample t = r1T  , . . . , r2T  with end-fraction
r2 ≥ r0 > 0, begin-fraction r1 satisfying r1 ≥ 0 and r1 ≤ r2 − r0, and window
width r2−r1 ≥ r0 ; the floor function · denotes the largest integer less than or
equal to its argument; and r0, r1 and r2 all denote fractions falling between 0 and
1.The asymptotic distribution of GSADF (r0) under the null is given in PSY
(2015a). As the notation suggests, the distribution depends on the minimum
sample size fraction r0. Critical values for the test are obtained by simulation
and are sample size T dependent in a manner that ensures that the size of the
test tends to zero as T → ∞, thereby eliminating false positives asymptoti-
cally under the null, and assuring consistency under the alternative, so that test
power tends to unity as as T →∞. Readers are referred to PSY (2015a&b) for
further details, limit theory, simulation performance and an illustration with
long historical stock market series.
Following the simulation design rule given in PSY (2015b), we set the mini-
mum subsample size to r0 = 0.01 + 1.8/
√
T 	 0.21 for the price-to-rent sample
(i.e, 21% of the sample which in the present case amounts to 18 quarters). For
the price-to-income series we set the minimum subsample size to be smaller in
order to capture the onset of the mid 2000s bubble: r0 = 0.18.
Dating Episodic Bubbles To determine the origination date of a bubble
we use the first crossing time dating algorithm of PSY, which we briefly de-
scribe here. The approach relies on recursive calculation over the full sample of
the same backwards supremum ADF statistic on which the GSADF statistic is
based, viz.,






For each date fraction r, we compute the supremum of the ADF statistic based
on subsamples beginning with t = 1, 2, ..., (r − r0)T  and ending at rT . The
asymptotic distribution of BSADFr (r0) under the null of no bubbles is given
in PSY (2015a), and, as the notation suggests, the distribution depends on the
minimum sample size fraction r0 as well as the fraction date r. Critical values
for the test are obtained by simulation.
Following PSY, the bubble dating algorithm uses first crossing time methods
to determine estimates of the origination and termination dates of a bubble in
the data. In particular, we date the beginning of the bubble as the initial date
fraction (rˆe, say) for which the BSADFr (r0) statistic exceeds a pre-specified
critical value (say, cvβT ) that is based on the null distribution. The correspond-
ing collapse date of the bubble is estimated as the first fraction (rˆf ) for which the
BSADFr (r0) sequence falls below the critical value again after some amount
of time LT has elapsed from the origination of the bubble. The role of LT is
to eliminate from consideration as potential bubbles any short-lived blips in the
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recursive statistic whose fractional duration is less than LTT → 0, where LT is
some slowly varying function such as LT = μ log T for some constant μ > 0.
To fix ideas in a possible multiple bubble scenario, we have the following




r : BSDFr (r0) > cv
βT

, rˆif = inf
r∈[rie+T ,1]





where rˆie (rˆif ) denotes the origination (collapse) date fraction of the ith bubble,
cvβT is the 100 (1− βT )% critical value of the BSADF statistic, and T is a
regularly varying fractional delay function (such as T = LTT =
μ log(T )
T for
some fixed μ > 0) which places a minimum bound time (LT ) on the duration
of the bubble. The parameter μ is time-unit sensitive and usefully allows for
diﬀerences in the minimum delay time according to whether the units are in
months, quarters or years.
5.1.2 Contagion Regressions
The time varying coeﬃcient function δ2j (r) may be estimated by local level
kernel regression according to the formula


















, K (·) is a smooth kernel function, and h is a
bandwidth parameter. In our application we use the Gaussian kernel K (·) =
(2π)−1/2 e− 12 (·)
2
and set the bandwidth (BW) h according a simple cross vali-
dation approach. Our estimate of h is obtained by the cross validation criterion











































Note that this CV BW h˘jT (d) depends on the lag d. We then choose d to
minimise the equation j mean square error (MSE) as follows














In this way we obtain a data dependent BW and lag parameter that jointly












Figure A1: House Prices (solid line; left axis) and Rents (dashed line; right
axis) in the Main Centres
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Figure A2: House Prices (solid line; left axis) and Rents (dashed line; right
axis) in the Auckland Metropolitan Area
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5.3 Data
Our real estate dataset spans Q1 1993 to Q4 2014 and covers all 72 Territorial
Authorities (TAs) in mainland NZ under the TA06 geographic boundaries.
House Prices Our measures of regional house prices are based on the quar-
terly residential price indices published by QVNZ. These data span Q4 1989
through to Q4 2014 and cover 72 Territorial Authorities. QVNZ also publish
these indices for the broader Auckland and Wellington Metro Areas, as well
as the whole of New Zealand; these are used in our analysis of price-to-income
ratios. The estimates for Q4 2014 was provisional at the time of writing. Linear
interpolation was applied to each time series to infill any missing observations.
QVNZ also publishes a monthly nominal (non-inflation adjusted) average price
for all dwellings for all TAs dating back to December 2003. Price indices only
reflect diﬀerences in the price level in a given year relative to a base year.
Therefore, in order to obtain price-to-rent ratios we scale the price index by the




i,DEC2014 × Ii,t ÷ Ii,Q42014,
where PAVGi,DEC2014 is the average price in December 2014 for region i, and Ii,t is
the residential price index in quarter t for region i. Pi,t is therefore the QVNZ
residential price index scaled to ensure that the index value for Q4 2014 coincides
with the average house price in December 2014. Note that this scaling does not
aﬀect the econometric methodology used in the present work since the scaling
factor simply induces a multiplicative constant in the price-to-rent ratio.
Rents Raw monthly data of average rent per week for each territorial region
spanning from 1993 to 2014 was obtained from the Ministry of Business, Inno-
vation & Employment (http://www.dbh.govt.nz/nz-housing-and-construction-
quarterly-open-data). Linear interpolation was applied to each time series to
infill any missing observations. The rent series were seasonally adjusted using
X11, using a 2 x 12 filter for the trend component and a 3 x 3 filter for the sea-
sonal component. Some of the time series exhibited large outliers. We therefore
removed and linearly interpolated any single month that exhibited an absolute
change greater than 5% relative to the X11 trend. Figure A5 demonstrates the
eﬀect of these adjustments made in the case of the Wellington City rent data.
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Figure A3: Wellington City Rents (in logarithms) before and after
adjustments to account for seasonality and outliers.
Annualized average weekly rents were obtained by multiplying the weekly
rental series by 52. Annualized quarterly rents were then obtained from the
monthly series by taking within-quarter averages.
Incomes Statistics New Zealand’s Earnings and Employment Survey (QEX)
publishes average weekly earnings per full time equivalent (FTE) worker on
a quarterly basis for Q3 1999 onwards. Earnings are geographically disag-
gregated by Regional Council. Of these, only the Auckland and Wellington
Regional Councils approximate a metropolitan area: The Auckland Region ap-
proximates the Rodney, North Shore, Waitakere, Auckland City, Manukau, Pa-
pakura and Franklin TAs; while the Wellington Region approximates Wellington
City, Lower Hutt, Upper Hutt, Porirua, Kapiti, South Wairarapa, Carterton
and Masterton. We obtained total weekly earnings per FTE from infoshare
(http://www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare/) before multiplying the figures by 52 to
obtain annual earnings per FTE worker.
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